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SUMMARY
The Paycheck Fairness Act is critical legislation that addresses several gaps in the Equal
Pay Act. Federal equal pay laws have become an empty promise for many women who
experience pay discrimination. This Act sets forth a balanced approach—with both proactive
strategies and a more workable legal remedy—that will ensure “equal pay for equal work.”
Most importantly, the Act amends the “any factor other than sex” defense—a gaping
loophole which has swallowed the “equal pay for equal work” rule in some cases—with the
common sense fairness notion that a wage disparity between two employees who perform the
same jobs should be based on a bona fide factor related to the job or business. This standard is
already used in a majority of federal courts and has been adopted by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Two federal circuits have interpreted this defense as “anything under
the sun,” even if unrelated to the job or business. The idea that differences in pay should relate
to the job and business is not only a matter of basic fairness; it is simply smart business. The Act
leaves it to the employer’s sole discretion which factors should be used to determine pay.
Second, the Act recognizes, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, that “sunshine is the best
disinfectant.” Pay secrecy has allowed unlawful pay disparities between men and women
performing the same jobs to flourish, undetected and undeterred. To address this problem, the
Act prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who ask about or discuss wage
information and facilitates the collection and study of pay data so we better understand the
causes of pay discrimination. This reinforces that the law’s requirement of equal pay for equal
work cannot be ignored simply because no one knows about unlawful pay disparities. It will
motivate employers to correct unjustified pay disparities before they turn into fodder for
litigation. The Act also creates an award for employers who demonstrate best practices and
encourages negotiation training for women and girls. These provisions provide a balanced,
proactive approach to combating wage discrimination.
Third, the Act addresses the difficulties that women have in remedying the multiple
harms of pay discrimination by allowing compensatory and punitive damages in appropriate
cases and permitting employees to join together in a class action to address systemic violations.
These provisions will put gender pay discrimination on equal footing with federal law regarding
pay discrimination based on race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and be a stronger deterrent against the
subset of employers that flout the nation’s equal pay laws.

Chairwoman Mikulski and members of the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions, I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before you in support of the
Paycheck Fairness Act. This issue is important to me as a scholar who has studied the current
failure of federal law to provide a workable remedy for most women who experience pay
discrimination in the modern economy; as a former employment litigator and now mediator who
has witnessed first-hand the profound impact that compensation discrimination has on women,
and the difficulties they have seeking a remedy for that harm; and as a proud mother of two
daughters.
The Paycheck Fairness Act is critical legislation that expresses our nation’s commitment
to equal pay for equal work and addresses several gaps in the Equal Pay Act. It should be passed
for four main reasons:
1) Most importantly, the Paycheck Fairness Act amends the “any factor other than sex”
defense—a gaping loophole which has swallowed the “equal pay for equal work” rule in some
jurisdictions—with the common sense fairness notion that a wage differential between two
employees who perform the same jobs should be based on a bona fide factor related to the job or
business. This standard is already working well in a majority of federal circuit courts and has
been adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but two federal circuits have
interpreted this defense to mean “anything under the sun,” even if unrelated to the job or
business. The idea that differences in pay should bear some relation to the job and business
should be an uncontroversial proposition. It is not only a matter of basic fairness (for all
employees) and equal opportunity for women; it is simply smart business and good corporate
governance for an employer to be more thoughtful about how its pay awards relate to the job and
business.
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2) The Paycheck Fairness Act recognizes, in the words of Justice Brandeis, that
“sunshine is the best disinfectant” by prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees
who simply ask about, discuss, or disclose wage information. As described below and in my
scholarship, pay secrecy has allowed unlawful pay disparities between men and women
performing the same jobs to flourish, undetected and undeterred. The Act also facilitates the
collection and analysis of pay data so we better understand the causes of pay discrimination. It
will reinforce that the law’s requirement of equal pay for equal work cannot be ignored simply
because no one knows about unlawful pay disparities. And it will motivate employers to correct
unjustified pay disparities before they turn into fodder for federal litigation. This is a balanced,
proactive approach.
3) The Paycheck Fairness Act provides an incentive for voluntary compliance and the
development of best practices by employers by establishing a National Award for Pay Equity in
the Workplace, while empowering women and girls with negotiation training so they can better
navigate the often difficult and risky process of salary negotiations.
4) The Paycheck Fairness Act addresses the difficulties that women have in remedying
the multiple harms of pay discrimination by providing compensatory and punitive damages and
permitting them to join together in a class action to address systemic violations. These
provisions will put gender pay discrimination on equal footing with federal law regarding pay
discrimination based on race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and be a stronger deterrent against the
subset of employers that flout the nation’s equal pay laws.
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At the outset, I want to dispel some common myths about the Paycheck Fairness Act.
Myth #1: This will open the floodgates to frivolous lawsuits by “jack-pot” trial
lawyers
Opponents who suggest that this legislation will somehow open the floodgates to
frivolous EPA claims by “trial lawyers” do not understand (or are not being forthright) about the
realities of equal pay litigation. In addition to being expensive and extremely difficult to win,
pursuing an employment discrimination lawsuit can damage a plaintiff’s mental and physical
health and often results in career suicide. In addition, this area of the law is complicated and
tends to be litigated on both the employee and management sides by sophisticated attorneys who
understand that most plaintiffs in federal employment discrimination cases do not prevail, and
that employers will win most cases at the summary judgment stage.
Rest assured: most women do not want to sue their employers—they want the law to
express a stronger commitment to equal pay for equal work so employers will have an incentive
to pay them fairly without the need for litigation. Moreover, employee-side attorneys who
handle employment discrimination cases tend to do this work out of a sense of a public interest
mission as a “private attorney general,” enforcing our nation’s equal opportunity laws. Filing
“frivolous” cases will not keep the lights on in their law offices. The idea that attorneys would
put their law licenses and reputations on the line by filing “frivolous” cases—and that our smart
federal judges would allow those “frivolous” cases to proceed to a jury, and then juries would
award astronomical damages for unmeritorious claims—is a fantastical red herring.
Myth #2: This Changes the “Equal Work” Standard into “Comparable Worth”
Nothing in the Paycheck Fairness Act permits the concept of “comparable worth” to be
used in the EPA. The prima facie standard of “equal work” remains.
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Myth #3: The Government Will Interfere in Pay Decisions
Employers are already obligated under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII to refrain from
pay discrimination and ensure equal pay for substantially equal jobs. The problem is that pay
secrecy and the lack of effective workable remedies has allowed unlawful pay discrimination to
flourish undetected and unaddressed in some workplaces. The Paycheck Fairness Act reaffirms
our commitment to equal pay for equal work by encouraging employers to give more attention to
ensuring that their pay practices honor that promise—but it leaves pay decisions entirely up to
the employer’s sole discretion.
To be clear: this Act does not get the government involved in wage-setting at all. The
Act does not dictate to employers which factors should be used in setting pay. It merely requires
that pay decisions bear some relation to the job and business. This is not only about basic
fairness for employees performing the same jobs and equal opportunity for women: it is simply
smart business. As generally accepted in the executive compensation context, it is good
corporate governance to relate pay to performance and the goals of the job and business. In
addition to helping to reduce the gender pay gap, studies have also shown that employees who
understand how pay is determined are more likely to be productive and loyal to their employers.1
As described below, in some industries there is an “anything goes” approach to wage
setting—facilitated by pay secrecy—that has permitted wildly divergent and unfair pay rates
between employees doing the same job. We can, and must, do better than that if “equal pay for
equal work” is ever going to be a reality.
The rest of my testimony explains how pay discrimination manifests itself in the modern
economy, describes how existing equal pay laws have failed to provide an effective remedy for
women who experience pay discrimination, and examines how the Paycheck Fairness Act will
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help to deter pay discrimination against women.
1. Status of Women’s Wages in Today’s Market
Equal pay laws have undoubtedly increased women’s earning power and encouraged
most employers to take pay equity seriously. Yet, the pay gap between men and women who
perform substantially equal jobs remains widespread, persistent, and systemic in our economy.
The rhetoric about the “gender pay gap” tends to be heated and polarizing but one thing is clear:
study after study that has examined the pay gap has demonstrated that unexplained pay
disparities between men and women performing substantially equal jobs remain even after
controlling for so-called “choice” factors—such as education, years of work experience, age,
hours worked, occupational field, and jobs held.2
I have written about how the gender pay gap is more complex—and in many job
categories much worse—than the aggregate statistic that women who work full-time, year round
earn about 77 cents for every dollar earned by their male peers.3 The overall wage gap is only
the tip of the iceberg. The problem is even more alarming when one examines data regarding
men and women who have similar qualifications and perform similar jobs, especially women
who try to climb the economic ladder and move into higher-paying jobs.
Women at every wage level and in nearly every industry experience a wage gap.
Consider these statistics:


Women in the ten largest low-wage occupations are paid an average of about 10 cents
less than men in those occupations for full-time work.4



Although women generally are becoming better educated than men—earning more
college and advanced degrees—women with higher education levels experience a greater
pay gap than women who have less educational attainment.5



Contrary to the notion that more education and experience will decrease the wage gap,
the disparity increases for women who attain the highest levels of education and
professional achievement, such as lawyers (female lawyers earn 74.9% as much as their
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male peers),6 physicians and surgeons (64.2%),7 securities and commodities brokers
(64.5%),8 accountants and auditors (75.8%),9 and managers (72.4%).10


A wage gap exists for men and women who have the same education and enter the same
jobs at the start of their careers. For example, a recent study of starting salaries of
graduates of medical residency programs in New York found that male physicians made
on average $16,819 more than their female cohorts. The regression models in the study
controlled for ten variables that could potentially affect wage rates, including specialty
choice, practice setting, work hours, geographic location, and other characteristics.11
According to the researchers, “We honestly tried everything we could to make it go
away, but it wouldn’t.”12



The wage gap between men and women performing the same jobs starts small, but
balloons throughout their careers. A regression analysis by the American Association of
University Women found that, after controlling for choice factors that could affect pay,
about one-quarter of the pay gap (5%) remained for recent college graduates—that is,
men and women with exactly the same education entering the same job at the same
time—but ten years after graduation the unexplained pay gap grew to 12%.13



Some say that the gender pay gap can be explained because men work more hours than
women. But women who work the greatest number of hours experience a higher
disparity.14



The wage gap exists even in professions in which women have long dominated,
such as education,15 nursing,16 social work,17 and clerical work.18
In sum, fifty years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act, pay discrimination is still a

serious problem for too many women in America. Based on my research and experience, I
believe there are several reasons this is still happening.
First, it is my firm belief that most employers try to comply with the law and do not set
out to intentionally discriminate against women. Nevertheless, there is no question that pay
discrimination remains. In some cases, that discrimination is as blatant as it was during the
1960s, with some employers professing that men deserve to be paid more. For example, women
who worked at Walmart reported that managers told them that male employees would always
make more because “God made Adam first, so women would always be second to men” and
“[y]ou don’t have the right equipment. . . . [Y]ou aren’t male, so you can’t expect to be paid the
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same.”19 When one plaintiff asked her manager why a male co-worker in the same position was
making $10,000 more per year, the manager told her to bring in her household budget so he
could decide whether she deserved as much as the man.20 Examples of these sexist attitudes
exist in other pay discrimination cases.21
Second, the stereotype that working mothers do not need to be paid as much, and that
working fathers deserve more pay, sometimes creeps into the wage setting process, often
unconsciously. Working mothers tend to experience a “motherhood penalty” in wages that
cannot be explained by human capital or occupational factors.22 In one study, participants
evaluated application materials for a pair of same-gender, equally qualified job candidates who
differed only on parental status.23 The study found that “mothers were judged as significantly
less competent and committed than women without children.”24 In addition, “[t]he recommended
starting salary for mothers was $11,000 (7.4%) less than that offered to nonmothers, a significant
difference.”25 In contrast, fathers were offered significantly higher salaries than nonfathers.”26
It is a fallacy today to think that mothers are not working to support their families. A
recent study found that a huge majority of middle-income mothers work forty or more hours per
week.27 About half of all mothers work full-time.28 Two-thirds of the 21.7 million working
mothers are part of a dual-earner family, but one-third—or 7.5 million mothers—“were the sole
job-holders in their family, either because their spouse was unemployed or out of the labor force,
or because they were heads of households.”29 During the recession, “families where the mother
was the only job-holder increased.30 As a recent Congressional report concluded, “[m]ore than
ever, families depend on mothers’ work.”31
A third factor that lowers women’s wages is that compensation decisions in today’s
economy tend to be wholly discretionary on the part of certain managers, without company
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guidance about how pay should be determined and work rewarded. The more discretionary and
subjective the process for setting pay—which tends to be the case for management and
professional occupations—the greater the gender pay gap. I saw this in an equal pay case I
litigated on behalf of a Chief Technology Officer at a technology start-up. Her base salary was
less than all of the men on the executive team, but the disparities in discretionary components
were extreme: her bonuses were only about one half, and her stock options awards only about
one-quarter, of the awards given to all of the men on the executive team.32
A large body of social science research demonstrates that sex-stereotyping and
unconscious cognitive biases influence pay decisions that are based on subjective, arbitrary, or
discretionary assessments.33 In addition, studies show that significant gender differences in
salaries will occur in “high ambiguity” industries—those in which employees are not well
informed about the appropriate amount to request during salary negotiations.34 A study of MBA
students entering their first jobs found that women who entered industries in which salaries were
more ambiguous “accepted salaries that were 10 percent lower on average than did the men.”35
This is also reflected in wage statistics. Although a gender wage gap exists in nearly every
occupation and industry, it tends to be the lowest for more standardized, low-wage jobs for
which the compensation structures are well-defined and non-negotiable.
The problem is that wages in the modern economy are more likely to be the product of a
negotiation process, conducted under conditions of pay secrecy with little to no guiding company
standards. Rather than the lock-step compensation plans of the industrial era, many job sectors
today follow a “winner-take-all” and “anything goes” approach to setting pay. These trends have
exacerbated internal pay inequities, resulting in wildly divergent salaries for individuals
performing essentially the same jobs.36
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These dynamics disproportionately disadvantage women’s pay. Negotiation experts
explain that unconscious gender-stereotypes are more likely to skew results against women when
compensation decisions are informal and unguided. Studies show, however, that if pay processes
are more transparent and women have adequate information during the negotiation process,
gender pay disparities may be reduced or eliminated altogether.37
2. Current Federal Law Fails to Provide an Effective Remedy for Pay
Discrimination
My scholarship has analyzed how the Equal Pay Act (EPA), which the Paycheck Fairness
Act amends, currently provides an empty promise for many women who experience pay
discrimination. Although evaluation of equal pay claims is supposed to be fact-intensive,38
modern courts increasingly dismiss cases at the summary judgment stage rather than permitting
the claims to proceed to a jury trial. In a study I conducted of all cases in which federal district
courts considered whether to grant summary judgment on an EPA claim over the last decade
(from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2011), only about one-third survived summary
judgment.39 In other words, the merits of equal pay claims rarely make it before juries and most
women who file equal pay cases are stopped at the summary judgment “starting gate.” In
addition, employees whose cases make it to an appellate level are less likely to prevail on equal
pay claims today than at any other time since the EPA’s passage.40
There are several reasons for the EPA’s ineffectiveness in the modern economy:
The Prima Facie Hurdle: The EPA requires that employees of opposite sexes at the
same establishment receive equal pay for equal work. To state a claim under the EPA, plaintiffs
must first meet a very strict “prima facie” threshold standard. A plaintiff must show that he or
she performs substantially “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skills,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.”41 My
10

research has explained that this prima facie standard has been interpreted by some courts so
strictly that it leaves many women in the modern economy—especially those in non-standardized
or upper-level jobs—outside of the EPA’s protection.42 The Paycheck Fairness Act does not
change the substantially equal work standard and it is likely to continue to be stumbling block for
most plaintiffs in EPA cases.
The “Anything Under the Sun” Defense: If a plaintiff survives the strict prima facie
standard of showing “equal work,” the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that
the pay disparity actually resulted from one of four affirmative defenses: “(i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”43
Most employers in EPA cases rely on the catch-all “factor other than sex” defense and
rarely invoke the first three.44 In a majority of circuits45 and under the EEOC’s interpretation,46
the employer is not permitted to rely on literally any other factor, but only a factor that is jobrelated, adopted for a legitimate business reason, and not based on sex. As courts have
explained, “[w]ithout a job-relatedness requirement, the factor-other-than-sex defense would
provide a gaping loophole in the statute through which many pretexts for discrimination would
be sanctioned.”47 Unfortunately, in a minority of federal circuit courts, that loophole exists.48
The Paycheck Fairness Act codifies the majority view that the “factor other than sex”
defense does not mean “anything under the sun” other than an admission of sex discrimination.
Rather, the factor must be related to the job in question and consistent with business necessity.
This amendment is the most important provision of the Paycheck Fairness Act. It will encourage
employers to develop more clearly defined compensation systems—guided by any
considerations the employer wants—so long as they relate to the business and job. As one
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federal judge commented: “The Equal Pay Act concerns business practices. It would be
nonsensical to sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration unrelated to the
business.”49
Some opponents contend that adopting the majority view will somehow threaten the freemarket system and turn courts into “super-personnel officers.” That has not happened in the
majority of circuits in which this standard has already been operating. In addition, the argument
that employers must be able to use vague, ill-defined “market” excuses for pay discrimination
among equal jobs is alarming to hear fifty years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act. Indeed,
the EPA was designed to alter the compensation market so that employers would not pay women
less than men performing substantially equal jobs simply because that was what the “market”
required or permitted, or because men asked for more pay than women did.50
Given the distinct market purpose of the EPA, early cases flatly rejected “market forces”
defenses asserted by employers because they perpetuated the very discrimination that Congress
sought to alleviate.51 Courts noted that the EPA aimed to cure imbalances in the compensation
market based on gender. As the Supreme Court stated in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan:
The whole purpose of the Act was to require that these depressed wages be raised,
in part as a matter of simple justice to the employees themselves, but also as a
matter of market economics, since Congress recognized as well that
discrimination in wages on the basis of sex “constitutes an unfair method of
competition.”52
Since the EPA was passed, the “market” defense in some EPA cases has evolved into an
escape hatch through which many pretexts for gender pay discrimination have been accepted. A
common market defense in EPA cases relies on employees’ prior salaries.53 If a man earned
more in a prior position with a different employer, and a woman earned less in a prior position
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with a different employer, they will be paid based on their prior salaries, regardless of whether
they are now performing substantially equal jobs and have comparable qualifications.
Market defenses also rely on negotiation outcomes: the male employee negotiated a
higher salary, and the woman either failed to ask for more pay, or was prohibited from
negotiating a higher rate.54 Negotiation defenses harm women. Studies have shown that
employers react more favorably to men who negotiate salaries, and that women may be reluctant
to ask for higher pay because they may be penalized for violating gender stereotypes and feel
more social pressure to agree to employers’ wage offers.55 This is compounded by the problem
of pay secrecy: employers enjoy a monopoly on pay information and women may not have
access to the same networks that men do to determine potential pay ranges.
Consider the following example from an equal pay case that I litigated. Like some
companies, the employer had no formal job descriptions or compensation system, which allowed
gender pay disparities between employees performing substantially equal jobs to flourish. The
supervisors of each department had great discretion to negotiate and set individual salary
amounts upon hiring, without guiding criteria. In one department, a female vice president was
hired months earlier than two other male vice presidents. All three were hired to do essentially
the same work. All had comparable qualifications for the job. The executive vice president who
hired them admitted that the female vice president had equal if not better performance and was
even appointed a “player lead” to train her male colleagues—yet her pay was substantially lower
than her male peers. When asked why he paid his female player-lead less than two men doing
the same job, the supervisor defended the disparity based on the employees’ prior salaries and
their wage negotiations with him.56 When asked why he failed to pay similarly qualified vice
presidents equal pay for equal work, the supervisor responded:
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Because I didn’t need to. I mean at the end of the day it was, at the end of the day
[sic] – first of all they, they didn’t need to see what each other’s salaries were.
They weren’t – it wasn’t like we post it on your name tag. So there was no
demotivation. [The female vice president] was somewhat aware what the other
people were making, so it was, you know, I didn’t want to demotivate her, but,
you know, at the end of the day you’re paying people, you know, the market rate,
you’re not necessarily paying them for a job. You know, you’re saying what’s it
take?57
As seen in this example, the “market” on which the supervisor relied was nothing more
than a haphazard situational accident, not a fair reflection of the job duties, skill sets, and
performance of the employees. The employer paid the worst performer the highest salary simply
because he asked for it. The female player-lead who trained her male peers received the lowest
salary, simply because her salary at a previous employer was lower than that of her male
counterparts. The law requires equal pay for equal work, but pay secrecy enables inequities
based on the happenstance of prior salaries—not the skills, responsibility, and effort required for
the job—to continue uncorrected. This perpetuates the very discrimination that Congress sought
to prevent with the EPA.
In other words, some employers’ vague assertions that the invisible hand of “the market”
dictated wage rates tend to be mythical covers for paying women less than men to perform
substantially equal jobs—for reasons that have nothing to do with actual market compensation
data, the job, or the merits of the employees in those jobs. Just as Congress saw through
employers’ assertions of “market forces” when the Equal Pay Act was passed, Congress should
pass the Paycheck Fairness Act to once again confirm that abstract notions of “the market” do
not trump the promise of equal pay.58
Title VII Also Does Not Provide an Adequate Remedy
Title VII is not a workable remedy for pay discrimination in most cases because of its
intent requirement, which is virtually impossible to show in these cases.59 Proving a
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discrimination case of any kind is extremely difficult. As one federal court noted:
Employment discrimination and retaliation, except in the rarest cases, is difficult
to prove. It is perhaps more difficult to prove such cases today than during the
early evolution of federal and state anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws.
Today’s employers, even those with only a scintilla of sophistication, will neither
admit discriminatory or retaliatory intent, nor leave a well-developed trail
demonstrating it.60
Proving pay discrimination is especially challenging. First, unlike hiring and promotions,
pay decisions are often made in secret,61 and psychological research has shown that
decisionmakers typically undervalue employees if they are women rather than men.62 Scholars
have shown how unconscious biases can lead to discrimination.63 When the decisionmaking
processes surrounding pay are opaque and guided by subjective factors, unconscious biases are
more likely to reduce women’s wages.64
Second, the employer has a monopoly on the information used to make the pay decision
and should have the burden of proving the reasons for that decision. Employees are typically not
privy to the decisionmaking process, and records of the reasons underlying pay decisions rarely
exist unless the company has an established compensation system. It is therefore easier for an
employer to craft post hoc excuses for pay disparities to mask discrimination.65 For these
reasons, the burden-shifting structure of the EPA is more appropriate for pay discrimination
claims. Indeed, some plaintiffs prevail on EPA claims but lose on Title VII claims due to
insufficient evidence of intent.66
In sum, the notion that women already have adequate, well-functioning tools to remedy
pay discrimination is belied by the experience of women who have attempted—unsuccessfully—
to vindicate the protections of Title VII and the EPA.
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3. The Paycheck Fairness Act Brings the Equal Pay Act into the Modern Era
In addition to adopting the standard used by a majority of federal circuits for the “factor
other than sex” defense, the Paycheck Fairness Act modernizes the Equal Pay Act in other
important ways:
a. Widening the “Same Establishment” for the Prima Facie Standard
The Paycheck Fairness Act permits plaintiffs to use comparators who work for the same
employer at a different physical location in the same county or similar political subdivision of a
state at the prima facie stage. This adapts to the reality that more employers have decentralized
structures. Note that this “same establishment” provision relates only to the showing of a prima
facie comparator who performs equal work: it would not preclude an employer from defending a
pay disparity at the affirmative defense stage based on a job or business-related reason, such as
the potential need to pay workers in an urban area of a county a higher wage.
b. Compensating for Non-Economic Harms of Pay Discrimination and Deterring
Malicious Conduct
If an employee wins an EPA case, she may recover only the amount of the pay disparity
(up to two years of back pay, or three years if a “willful” violation), plus an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages. The harms of pay discrimination often extend beyond the actual
dollar amount of the pay disparity.
Work is an essential component of how we define ourselves in this country. It brings us a
sense of purpose, dignity, and fulfillment. In many cases, women do not discover egregious pay
disparities between themselves and male co-workers who perform substantially the same jobs
until after many years or even decades of working hard for an employer. When that happens,
women often feel betrayed and humiliated. For many women, it eviscerates their sense of
identity and impacts their mental and physical health in dramatic ways. Yet, the EPA does not
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compensate for these very real harms. Such damages are available for victims of racial pay
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under Title VII for employment discrimination,
albeit at very low capped damage levels. The Paycheck Fairness Act recognizes that women
who experience pay discrimination should likewise have those damages available to them, where
appropriate.
In addition, for those cases in which employers act “with malice or reckless
indifference,” the Paycheck Fairness Act permits punitive damages. This enhanced penalty is
important for those cases in which proven violations are especially egregious and malicious. As
in other employment discrimination cases, such awards are likely to be extremely rare.
Nevertheless, their availability will express our strong commitment to equal pay for equal work
and be a strong deterrent against future violations.
c. Permitting Class Actions for Systemic Pay Discrimination
Under current law, the EPA does not permit class actions.67 Instead, it follows the Fair
Labor Standards Act collective action structure, which requires every individual plaintiff to
affirmatively “opt-in” to the litigation by filing a signed consent form with the court.68 The
benefit of this approach is that the preliminary certification standard for a collective action is
more lenient than the standard for class certification.69 Plaintiffs only need to show that they are
“similarly situated” and do not have to satisfy the more demanding prerequisites of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.
The major downside is that a collective action can be considerably more expensive to
manage and litigate. For example, rather than having a representative group of plaintiffs answer
discovery requests and appear for depositions, defense attorneys often demand answers to
interrogatories for and depositions of every member of the collective action (and then they seek
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to dismiss the claims of those individual plaintiffs who do not respond). This significantly raises
the costs of the litigation.
In addition, the opt-in collective action procedure is intimidating for many employees at
the initiation of litigation. Although the named plaintiffs may muster up the courage to take a
stand on behalf of the collective group, other employees may fear retaliation or be reluctant to go
on public record to challenge the employer in court. In this respect, employment class actions
are very different from other types of class actions, such as those involving consumer or
securities law. Whereas consumers or investors can simply purchase from another company or
go without the product in question, many employees do not want to risk unemployment and may
not be able to move to another employer if they lose their jobs. For many women, in particular,
claiming pay discrimination or suing their employer can be damaging to their future job
prospects. A class action procedure will help to protect those women who are similarly harmed
by a common discriminatory pay policy or practice but fear that they will be fired if they go on
public record against the employer.
Permitting class actions—which are available for most other types of employment
discrimination and have a more exacting standard for certification—would provide an important
tool to address systemic pay discrimination by the same employer.
d. Using “Sunshine as a Disinfectant” by Encouraging Better Wage Information
Pay secrecy is common in American workplaces. Most workers have no idea how their
pay is determined and do not know what their peers make. Many employers have strict pay
confidentiality policies, the violation of which can lead to termination, even though such policies
violate the National Labor Relations Act.70 Some women have been fired for asking about the
salaries of their male counterparts.71 Many women do not discover gross pay disparities until
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they, for example, receive anonymous letters on the eve of retirement,72 review proxy
statements,73 or are publicly ridiculed by co-workers who happen to see how low her paycheck
is.74
The Paycheck Fairness Act recognizes that a litigation remedy alone—which is reactive,
piecemeal, and difficult to achieve—will not fully address the problem of unequal pay for equal
work, especially when most pay discrimination remains “hidden from sight.”75 Greater
transparency about pay practices is needed to encourage compliance without litigation.
To that end, the Paycheck Fairness Act would prohibit employers from retaliating against
employees because they simply discuss or inquire about wages in the workplace. The Act also
instructs the Department of Labor to “conduct studies and provide information to employers,
labor organizations, and the general public concerning the means available to eliminate pay
disparities between men and women.”
These anti-retaliation and data collection provisions provide a balanced, proactive
approach to combating pay discrimination. My scholarship has explained how the compensation
market we have now in this country is failing because it lacks one of the key ingredients to a
well-functioning, efficient market: information.76 Better information and study about existing
market pay rates will help women understand their potential value in the marketplace and
provide an incentive for employers to address pay disparities among employees who perform
similar jobs before they turn into fodder for litigation. Greater pay data analysis will help to
sharpen our understanding of the causes of the gender wage gap and educate employers about
best practices. The Act also provides for training that will empower women and girls with better
tools to negotiate salaries and an employer pay equity award that will encourage the development
of best practices. These programs will engage both employees and employers in the effort to
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reduce the gender pay gap.
In conclusion, the Paycheck Fairness Act takes a balanced, commonsense approach to
adjusting the Equal Pay Act to the realities of the modern workplace. Without the Paycheck
Fairness Act, the Equal Pay Act will continue to be an “empty shell” for many women who
experience pay discrimination. As Congresswoman Dwyer stated in the original debates
regarding the EPA in 1963: “I can assure you that women would not be inclined to welcome an
empty shell of a bill—legislation with a title but with no substance. This would be a heartless
deception, and Congress would only be fooling itself if it should follow such a course.” 77

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important legislation.
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